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Prior to the nineteenth century, hunting regulations were few or
nonexistent in the United States.' This lack of regulation is attributed to
the colonists' reaction to European rules that permitted only the land-
owning gentry to hunt, and it was furthered by the abundance of
wildlife, which provided the food necessary for survival on the frontier.2
By the mid-nineteenth century, human dependence on hunting had
declined with the advent of the transportation and industrial
revolutions.3 At this time, hunting took on two different forms: (1)
commercial hunting and (2) recreational hunting.4  Concern for
declining wildlife populations prompted states to enact hunting
regulations.' To control and protect the wildlife populations, states6 (1)
prohibited commercial hunting of particular species and (2) limited
recreational hunting by requiring hunters to purchase licenses, by
imposing limits on the number of wildlife killed, and by restricting
nonresident hunters through limiting permits and imposing higher fees.7
Courts and commentators characterize such nonresident hunting
restrictions as "discriminatory" nonresident hunting regulations .
1. See Jason Scott Johnston, The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political Economics of
American Natural Resource Federalism, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 487, 555-56 (2003); Annotation,
Constitutionality of State Laws Which Discriminate Against Nonresidents or Aliens as to
Fishing and Hunting Rights, 52 L. Ed. 2d 824, 826 [hereinafter Constitutionality of State Laws].
2. See generally Darren K. Cottriel, Comment, The Right to Hunt in the Twenty-First
Century: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save an American Tradition?, 27 PAC. L.J. 1235, 1245
(1996).
3. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 555-56.
4. See id.; Constitutionality of State Laws, supra note 1, at 826.
5. Johnston, supra note 1, at 562. The Supreme Court in Geer v. Connecticut held that
the states have the power to regulate hunting. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
6. The federal government did not fully begin to regulate hunting until the twentieth
century. Johnston, supra note 1, at 557-58.
7. See id. at 555-56; Constitutionality of State Laws, supra note 1, at 826.
8. The use of "discriminatory" in this Comment does not reflect the negative
connotation that is often attributed to the word. Instead, the word discriminatory is simply
used to characterize a state's practice of differentiating between resident and nonresident
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Since the mid-nineteenth century, nonresident hunters have
challenged state restrictions on nonresident hunters. 9 These challenges
have been based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Dormant
Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution. ° Historically, courts have held that states
may enact discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations if the type of
hunting being regulated is typically a recreational activity, such as elk,
deer, or bird hunting; but in some instances, courts have held that a state
cannot discriminate when the hunting is typically a commercial activity,
such as shrimping." In 2002, advocates against discriminatory
nonresident hunting regulations challenged Arizona's regulations based
on the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Ninth Circuit held that
Arizona's discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations that regulated
typical recreational hunting violated the Dormant Commerce Clause."
As a consequence, other states' nonresident hunting regulations were
challenged, and in 2005, Congress enacted Public Law Number 109-13,
section 6036 ("section 6036"), which reaffirmed a state's right to
regulate hunting." The purpose of section 6036 was to prohibit courts
from declaring nonresident hunting regulations unconstitutional based
on the Dormant Commerce Clause. Despite the passage of section
6036, nonresident hunters continued to challenge the discriminatory
nonresident hunting regulations. The Tenth and Eighth Circuits held
that these challenges based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause
were insufficient and that because of section 6036, challenges based on
the Dormant Commerce Clause were Moot.14
This Comment theorizes in Part V that despite the passage of section
6036 and the Tenth and Eighth Circuits' opinions, nonresident hunters
will continue to challenge discriminatory nonresident hunting
regulations. This Comment argues that there are benefits and logical
reasons for discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations, and that
challenges to the constitutionality of nonresident hunting regulations
impair nonresident and resident hunters' opportunities to hunt. This
hunters. Furthermore, the use of hunter in this Comment is synonymous with terms angler
and trapper.
9. See generally McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877) (upholding a state law that
prohibited nonresidents from farming oysters).
10. See discussion infra Part II.B.
11. See discussion infra Part III.
12. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
13. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
14. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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Comment proposes that to enhance and protect hunting for both
resident and nonresident hunters, challenges to discriminatory
nonresident hunting regulations need to be minimized or eliminated.
This objective can be accomplished partially by modifying certain state
regulations and by improving awareness among hunters that these types
of challenges will diminish hunting opportunities.
To provide context for this Comment's proposal in Part V, Part II
provides background on the types of regulations that states impose on
nonresident hunters and an overview of the common constitutional
provisions used to attack nonresident regulations. Part III provides a
brief synopsis of the case law on nonresident regulations prior to the
Ninth Circuit's decision in 2002. Part IV provides an overview of the
Ninth Circuit's decision and the various reactions that followed,
including cases and Congressional action on nonresident regulations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Types of Nonresident Hunting Regulations
States use six types of regulations to restrict nonresident hunters. (1)
The quota regulation: a state reserves a percentage of the tags for
nonresident hunters.15 (2) The fee regulation: a state increases the fee
for a nonresident permit. 6 (3) The guide regulation: a state conditions
the release of a hunting permit to a nonresident hunter on the condition
that the nonresident hunter obtains the services of a state-licensed guide
or outfitter. 17 (4) The season regulation: a state shortens the hunting
season for nonresident hunters. 8 (5) The license regulation: a state
requires nonresident hunters but not resident hunters to purchase a
license. 9  (6) The weapon regulation: a state requires nonresident
hunters to hunt with a particular type of weapon.20 States can use a
combination of the six methods depending on the season and the
specific game.
15. See, e.g., Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (10th Cir. 2005). For example,
assuming there are 500 bull moose permits, and assuming there is a 10% quota for
nonresident hunters, then nonresident hunters will receive 50 bull moose permits.
16. See, e.g., id.
17. See, e.g., id.
18. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Hoeven, 456 F.3d 826, 828 (8th Cir. 2006).
19. See, e.g., Taulman v. Hayden, No. 05-1118, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65493, at *7 (D.
Kan. Sept. 13, 2006).
20. See, e.g., id. at *8; see generally KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 115 (2006).
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B. Constitutional Provisions Used to Challenge Nonresident Hunting
Regulations
Challenges to nonresident hunting regulations commonly are based
on the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause, and
the Dormant Commerce Clause." This Part provides a brief overview
of these constitutional provisions that are commonly used to challenge
discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations and describes a general
application of how a discriminatory nonresident hunting regulation
would be challenged under each of the provisions.
1. Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment states in part, "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."22  In analyzing an alleged equal
protection violation, the focus is on whether the state has a sufficient
purpose or objective to justify the discrimination.23 To determine
whether a state has a sufficient purpose or objective, the court asks
three questions.24
The first question is whether the challenged law is facially
discriminatory or facially neutral. If the law is facially neutral, then it is
only considered discriminatory if it has a discriminatory purpose and
impact.25 The second question is what level of scrutiny the court will
apply to the discriminatory law.26 A court uses strict scrutiny when the
law discriminates based on race, national origin, or sometimes
alienage,27 and when a fundamental right is at issue.2 8 A court uses
intermediate scrutiny when the law discriminates based on gender or
21. Cf. Constitutionality of State Laws, supra note 1, at 826-27 (indicating that the most
commonly used constitutional provision is the Privileges and Immunities Clause, but the
Equal Protection Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Supremacy Clause have been used
as well).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
23. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 643 (2d
ed. 2002).
24. Id. at 644-48.
25. Id. at 644.
26. Id. at 645.
27. Alienage or alien in this context simply refers to individuals who are not United
States citizens or who are foreign nationals.
28. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 645, 649. Under strict scrutiny, the court upholds
the law if the state proves the law is necessary to achieve a compelling state purpose and there
is no less discriminatory method to achieve the purpose. Id. at 645.
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non-marital children.2 9 A court uses rational basis scrutiny for all laws
not falling under the strict or intermediate scrutiny analysis." The third
question is whether the state law withstands the level of scrutiny
applied.31 In the case of strict scrutiny, the state law almost never
withstands the scrutiny." Conversely, under rational basis scrutiny, the
state law typically withstands the scrutiny,33 and it is uncertain as to
whether the state law will withstand intermediate scrutiny.3
Applying the three-question analysis to nonresident hunting
regulations, addressing the first question, nonresident hunting
regulations are typically facially discriminatory rather than facially
neutral because the regulations explicitly delineate separate
requirements for nonresidents. Addressing the second question, the
level of scrutiny applied to nonresident hunting regulations is the
rational basis test.35 A court might apply strict scrutiny if the law singled
out aliens or if the court recognized hunting as a fundamental right.
Usually, aliens are treated the same as nonresidents,36 so the level of
scrutiny most likely would remain at rational basis. Hunting might be
considered a fundamental right under some state constitutions,37 but
currently hunting is not considered a fundamental right, such as voting,
under the federal Constitution. Therefore, in addressing the third
question, because a court would most likely use rational basis scrutiny,
the court would most likely uphold discriminatory nonresident hunting
regulations under an equal protection challenge.
29. Id. Under intermediate scrutiny, the court upholds the law if the state proves the law
is substantially related to an important state purpose. Id.
30. Id. at 645-46. Under rational basis scrutiny, the court upholds the law if the non-
state entity cannot disprove that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Id.
at 646.
31. Id. at 647.
32. Id. at 645.
33. Id. at 646.
34. See id. at 645.
35. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 390-91 (1978); discussion infra
Part III.B.
36. See Constitutionality of State Laws, supra note 1, at 826.
37. See generally Bret Adams et al., Environmental and Natural Resources Provisions in
State Constitutions, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 73 (2002).
38. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 390-91 n.23 (finding that elk hunting is not a fundamental right
under the Constitution). See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (discussing the
constitutional right of voting).
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2. Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause
Article IV states that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States., 39 In
general, privileges and immunities are constitutional rights and
important economic activities.' Courts have recognized an important
economic activity to mean the right to a job or the right to one's
livelihood.' However, a state can discriminate against nonresidents
concerning a constitutional right or an important economic activity if the
state has a substantial reason for discriminating and the substantial
reason closely relates to the law. 2
Analyzing discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause begins with asking whether hunting is
a constitutional right or an important economic activity. Hunting has
yet to be recognized as a constitutional right.43 Whether hunting is an
important economic activity would depend on who challenged the law.
A nonresident hunter would have a difficult time establishing that
hunting was a job or a means to the hunter's livelihood because, in most
contexts, commercial hunting has been banned." If a guide or outfitter,
whose livelihood depended on nonresident hunters hiring the guide or
outfitter, challenged the regulation, then a court may consider hunting
to be an important economic activity, but this conclusion seems contrary
to a previous Supreme Court decision that upheld discriminatory
nonresident hunting regulations that were challenged by an outfitter.45
If a court held that hunting is an important economic activity under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, then the state would need to have a
substantial reason to discriminate that closely relates to the law.
Substantial reasons for the discriminatory regulations depend on what
type of regulation is at issue. A substantial reason for a fee regulation is
that residents pay income or property state taxes and that nonresidents
do not pay income or property state taxes.46 For a guide regulation, a
39. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
40. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 449-52.
41. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 386.
42. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 452-53.
43. See generally Constitutionality of State Laws, supra note 1.
44. Johnston, supra note 1, at 556.
45. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388, 390; discussion infra Part III.B.
46. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 389.
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substantial reason is that nonresidents are less familiar with the terrain,47
and for a quota regulation, a substantial reason is a need for
conservation. As long as the substantial reason closely related to the
regulation, the court would most likely uphold discriminatory
nonresident hunting regulations under a privileges and immunities
challenge.
3. Dormant Commerce Clause
The Dormant or Negative Commerce Clause, which prohibits a state
from burdening interstate commerce, is not directly found in any
41
constitutional provision. Instead, courts have inferred the Dormant
Commerce Clause from Article I, Section 8, which states in part,
"Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the
several states."5° Under a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the first
question is whether the law affects interstate commerce." If the law
does not affect interstate commerce, then there is no Dormant
Commerce Clause violation, but if the law does affect interstate
commerce, then the court must determine whether the law is facially
discriminatory. 2 The modern approach is that if a law is not facially
discriminatory, then the law is constitutional unless the benefits are
outweighed by the burden on interstate commerce. 3 Conversely, if the
law is facially discriminatory, the law is constitutional only if it is
necessary to achieve an important purpose: There are two exceptions
for discriminatory laws that otherwise would violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause.5 The first exception is if Congress authorizes the
state to regulate a specific instance of interstate commerce, and the
second exception is that a state can favor its residents for state
benefits 6
47. See Schutz v. Wyoming, No. 02-CV-165-D, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26518, at *15 (D.
Wyo. May 28, 2003), affd in part, vacated as moot in part sub nom. Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d
1128 (10th Cir. 2005).
48. Schutz, 415 F.3d at 1135.
49. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 401.
50. See id.; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
51. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 412.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 418.
54. Id. at 412.
55. Id. at 429.
56. Id. at 429, 431.
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Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis to discriminatory
nonresident hunting regulations begins by establishing whether hunting
is interstate commerce. It could be argued that hunting is interstate
commerce because nonresident hunters are traveling to and from states
or because the harvested animals become articles of commerce."
Because discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations are generally
facially discriminatory, the law needs to be necessary to achieve an
important purpose. An important purpose could be conservation, but
the law would still need to be necessary. Regardless of the law's
necessity, if Congress authorizes states to regulate hunting, then a court
most likely would uphold discriminatory nonresident hunting
regulations under the exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DISCRIMINATORY NONRESIDENT
HUNTING REGULATIONS PRIOR TO 2002
Cases prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in 2002 held that some
discriminatory nonresident regulations were unconstitutional while
others were constitutional. Scholars have noted that while the cases do
not explicitly outline a distinction, there are three possible ways to
distinguish the cases: (1) free-swimming sea animals versus non-free-
swimming sea animals, (2) hunting for sport versus hunting for a
livelihood, and (3) waters wholly within a state versus waters not wholly
within a state.58 The following two cases, Toomer v. Witsel 59 and
57. See Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2002);
discussion infra Part IV.A.
58. Constitutionality of State Laws, supra note 1, at 827. "[H]unting or fishing for sport
may not be entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as is hunting or fishing
pursued as a livelihood." Id. E.g., compare Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265
(1977) (finding a Virginia law that prohibited nonresidents from fishing for menhaden in the
Virginia portion of the Chesapeake Bay unconstitutional based on the Supremacy Clause),
and Connecticut v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84 (2nd Cir. 2003) (finding a New York law that imposed
restrictions on nonresident lobstermen unconstitutional based on the Privileges and
Immunities Clause), with McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877) (upholding a Virginia law
that fined nonresidents for planting oysters), and Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566
(10th Cir. 1995) (dismissing a Commerce Clause challenge to a Wyoming regulation that
limited the number of nonresident hunters because the plaintiffs failed to establish that the
regulations interfered with "their ability to provide commercial hunting services to
[non]resident hunters"), and Terk v. Ruch, 655 F. Supp. 205 (D. Colo. 1987) (finding that a
Colorado regulation that allocated 90% of the sheep and goat permits to residents did not
violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Commerce
Clause), and DeMasters v. Montana, 656 F. Supp. 21 (D. Mont 1986) (finding a Montana
regulation that restricted nonresident elk hunters did not violate the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Due Process Clause), and Shepherd
v. State, 897 P.2d 33 (Alaska 1995) (finding Alaskan law and regulations that mandated
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Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission,60 illustrate the distinction. In
Toomer, an example of hunting for free-swimming sea animals, hunting
for a livelihood, and waters not wholly within a state, the regulations
were unconstitutional.6' In Baldwin, an example of hunting for sport,
the regulations were constitutional.62
A. Toomer v. Witsell
In Toomer, five Georgian shrimpers sued South Carolina arguing
that South Carolina's shrimping regulations violated the Dormant
Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.63 In the
1940s, South Carolina regulated shrimping three miles off the South
Carolina coast. 4 South Carolina required all nonresident and resident
shrimpers to pay one-eighth of a cent per pound of shrimp, to pay all
income taxes on any profit from the shrimp, to dock in South Carolina,
and to stamp the shrimp before selling the shrimp to another state.65
However, South Carolina required resident shrimpers to pay only $25
per shrimp boat while nonresident shrimpers were required to pay $2500
per shrimp boat.66 In essence, South Carolina's regulations were an
example of a fee regulation in which nonresident shrimpers paid one
hundred times more than resident shrimpers.
The Court held that the tax of one-eighth of a cent per pound of
shrimp was not a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause because
the law did not discriminate against nonresident shrimpers.67 On the
other hand, the Court held that charging nonresident shrimpers one
hundred times more for a shrimping boat license was a violation of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause because the fee regulation in effect
preferential treatment to residents over nonresidents for moose, deer, elk, and caribou did
not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Commerce Clause, or the Equal
Protection Clause), and Berg v. Dep't of Natural Res., 324 N.W.2d 832 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982)
(unpublished) (finding that a Wisconsin regulation that imposed a fee for nonresident deer
and bear hunters did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the Equal
Protection Clause).
59. 334 U.S. 385, 387, 394-99 (1948).
60. 436 U.S. 371, 373 (1978).
61. 334 U.S. at 387, 394-99.
62. 436 U.S. at 388.
63. 334 U.S. at 387, 394-95.
64. Id. at 389.
65. Id. at 389-91.
66. Id. at 389.
67. Id. at 394-95.
20061
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
excluded resident shrimpers, and the state did not provide any
justification for the exclusion.'
B. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission
In Baldwin, an outfitter licensed as a hunting guide in Montana and
four customers of the outfitter sued the Fish and Game Commission of
Montana asserting that Montana's hunting regulations violated the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.69 In
1975, Montana required resident elk hunters to purchase a $4 license
and required nonresident elk hunters to purchase a $151 combination
license for one elk and two deer. ° In 1976, Montana required resident
elk hunters to purchase a $9 license and required nonresident elk
hunters to purchase a $225 combination license for one elk, one deer,
one black bear, game birds, and fish.7' Based on the 1976 fees, if a
resident hunter purchased a combination license, then the nonresident
hunter paid seven and one-half times more than the resident, but if the
resident hunter purchased only an elk license and the nonresident
hunter wants to hunt only elk, then the nonresident hunter pays twenty-
five times more. In essence, the Montana regulations were a type of
fee regulation.
The Court held that there was no violation of the Equal Protection
Clause because the state had a legitimate state interest in protecting the
wildlife, and charging nonresident hunters a higher fee was rationally
related to that legitimate state interest. 73 Furthermore, the Court held
that there was no violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
because elk hunting is a recreational sport and is not a "means to the
nonresident's livelihood.
7 4
68. Id. at 395-400.
69. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371,372-73 (1978).
70. Id. at 373.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 374.
73. Id. at 389.
74. Id. at 388.
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IV. DISCRIMINATORY NONRESIDENT HUNTING REGULATIONS POST-
2002
A. Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning
In 2002, Conservation Force, Inc.75 and three employees of United
States Outfitters ("USO") 7 6 sued the state of Arizona because Arizona
had a ten percent cap on nonresident bull elk and antlered deer hunting
permits.77 This type of regulation is an example of a quota regulation.
The Ninth Circuit held that the Dormant Commerce Clause applied
to the discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations because the
regulation has a "substantial effect on interstate commerce such that
Congress could regulate the activity."78  The court reasoned that
interstate commerce was substantially affected because "hunting in
Arizona promotes interstate travel," and Arizona permitted the sale of
nonedible portions of the wildlife, and therefore, hunting affects the
"interstate flow of goods."
' 79
After determining that hunting substantially affects interstate
commerce, the Ninth Circuit began to apply the Dormant Commerce
Clause test by stating "the regulation is subject to strict scrutiny under
which it is the state's burden to show that the discrimination is narrowly
tailored to further a legitimate state interest." 8  The Ninth Circuit
concluded that Arizona does have a legitimate state interest, but it
remanded to the district court to determine whether there are other
non-discriminatory means to advance the state interest.81 The district
court held that there were other non-discriminatory means, and Arizona
was required to issue new regulations that would be in accordance with
the court's opinion. 2
75. Conservation Force, Inc. is an international non-profit public foundation that serves
the hunter who travels. Conservation Force: Corporate Description, http://www.conserva
tionforce.org/corp.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
76. The three employees were Lawrence Montoya, Filberto Valerio, and Carole Jean
Taulman. 2006 United States Outfitters Brochure 2 (2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter
2006 Brochure]. USO provides outfitting services in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. See id. at 14.
77. Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2002).
78. Id. at 993 (internal quotations omitted).
79. Id. at 993-94.
80. Id. at 995.
81. Id. at 1000.
82. Montoya v. Shroufe, No. CIV 98-0239-PHX RCB, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13353, at
*35 (D. Ariz. Jul. 13, 2004).
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B. Reactions to Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning
Because a majority of states have discriminatory nonresident
hunting regulations, the potential ramifications of Conservation Force,
Inc. v. Manning were significant. ' As a result, legal commentators,
courts, hunters, states, and Congress all had various reactions to the
decision in Conservation Force, Inc. This Part provides an overview of
the different reactions and attempts to provide justifications or reasons
for the different reactions.
1. The Law: Courts and Commentators
The legal commentary on Conservation Force, Inc. was sparse, but
the legal commentary available both praised and criticized the Ninth
Circuit. Commentators criticized the Ninth Circuit's decision because
the Ninth Circuit failed to understand the implications of limiting a
state's ability to regulate commerce in light of the Supreme Court's
decisions' that limited the federal government's power to regulate
commerce. 8' As a result, the Ninth Circuit was pushing commerce into
an area that could not be regulated by the state or federal government; a
vacuum of power was created.' The Ninth Circuit's decision was
praised for its reasoning that found that the Arizona statute, which
allowed the sale of non-edible parts of the game, affected the interstate
flow of goods.
In Schutz v. Wyoming, the District Court of Wyoming criticized the
Ninth Circuit and did not adopt its reasoning.' Wyoming used a
combination of the guide, fee, and quota regulations for nonresident
83. See Minnesota v. Hoeven, 456 F.3d 826, 829 n.6 (8th Cir. 2006).
84. See, e.g., Dale Bish, Note, The Unfounded Fears of Environmental Balkanization:
The Ninth Circuit's Dangerous Expansion of the Commerce Cause, 37 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV.
605, 625-37 (2003).
85. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress did not have
the authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit firearm possession in local school zones
because firearm possession in local school zones was not an economic activity that
substantially affected interstate commerce); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(holding that Congress did not have the authority under the Commerce Clause to provide a
civil remedy for gender-motivated violence victims because gender-motivated violence was
not an economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce).
86. See Bish, supra note 84.
87. See, e.g., Michael Miller, Casenote, Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning: When
Hunting Means Business, 7 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 71 (2003).
88. Schutz v. Wyoming, No. 02-CV-165-D, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26518, at *15 (D.
Wyo. May 28, 2003), affd in part, vacated as moot in part sub nom. Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d
1128 (10th Cir. 2005).
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hunters. 89 The court denied the outfitter's summary judgment motion
claiming that Wyoming hunting statutes are unconstitutional and
granted the State of Wyoming's summary judgment motion.9° The court
concluded that the Wyoming statutes, which permitted the sale of non-
edible parts, were very similar to the Arizona statutes at issue in
Conservation Force, Inc. 9 However, the court concluded that the
Dormant Commerce Clause did not apply to the Wyoming statutes.
92
Additionally, the court said that the practice of hunting in other states
and then selling the trophies on eBay was shocking and disgraceful. 93
The court went on to criticize the Ninth Circuit for misapplying the
Dormant Commerce Clause, especially in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Morrison,9 which limited Congress's power
to regulate commerce. 9'
2. Hunters and States
Hunters also criticized and praised the Ninth Circuit's decision. The
different reactions among hunters can be partially attributed to a
hunter's financial status and geographic location. Nonresident hunting
is an expensive recreational activity; a five-day elk hunt can cost $8000,
which does not include a hunter's personal gear and travel expenses.'
Therefore, many hunters felt that the decision in Conservation Force,
Inc. would benefit only those who could afford the nonresident hunting
trips. Furthermore, resident hunters that reside in the western states
and benefit from the discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations
viewed Conservation Force, Inc. as a hindrance on their hunting
opportunities."
Similarly, state governments both praised and criticized the decision
in Conservation Force, Inc. Possible explanations for the praise and
criticism can partially be attributed to a state's geographic location, the
current nonresident hunting regulations, and whether the state is a
89. Id. at *2.
90. Id. at *29-30.
91. Id. at *20.
92. Id.
93. See id. at *21 n.5.
94. 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see supra note 85.
95. See Schutz, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26518, at *29.
96. See 2006 Brochure, supra note 76, at 17.
97. See generally C. Douglas Nielsen, Lawsuit Could Affect Big-game Draw, LAS VEGAS




popular place to hunt for nonresident hunters.98  For example, the
Nevada and North Dakota governments were opposed to the decision in
Conservation Force, Inc., and neither government wanted to change its
current nonresident hunting regulations." Both Nevada and North
Dakota are popular states for nonresident hunters to hunt."°
Conversely, Minnesota embraced the decision in Conservation Force,
Inc.'O Minnesota's governor, its attorney general, and U.S.
Congressman Colin Peterson, "an avid duck hunter," sued North
Dakota because North Dakota's nonresident hunting regulations
hindered Minnesota duck hunters.l
3. Congress
Congress reacted quickly to and in disfavor of the decision in
Conservation Force, Inc. On February 9, 2005, Senator Harry Reid of
Nevada introduced Senate Bill 399, "A Bill To reaffirm the authority of
States to regulate certain hunting and fishing activities. '  Fourteen
Senators from Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming cosponsored the bill.' This bill was a rider amendment to an
appropriations bill, the "Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005."' '
On May 11, 2005, Congress passed the "Reaffirmation of State
Regulation of Resident and Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Act of
98. See infra Part IV.B.3; Brief for the States of South Dakota, Alaska, Colorado,
Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellees, Minnesota v. Hoeven, 456 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-3012) (stating that the
states that are amicus curiae support discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations).
99. See Nevada Wildlife Commission: Policy Update (2005) (on file with author),
available at http://www.ndow.org/about/commission/lit/; Richard Hinton, Minnesota AG:
Legislators too Protective, BISMARCK TRIBUNE, March 11, 2004, at Al.
100. See generally 2006 Brochure, supra note 76, at 7; Minnesota v. Hoeven, 370 F. Supp.
2d 960 (D.N.D. 2005), affd in part, affd in part on other grounds, 456 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006).
101. See Jim Lee, Duck Hunter Sues N.D. over Nonresident Rules, CENT. WIS. SUNDAY,
May 2, 2004, at 7B.
102. See id.; Hoeven, 370 F. Supp. 2d 960.
103. S. 339, 109th Cong. (2005).
104. See id.
105. H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. § 6060 (2005); see Nevada Wildlife Commission: Policy
Update, supra note 99. "The term 'rider' refers to substantive legislation given a 'ride' on an
appropriations bill." Julie A. Coldicott, Note, Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas;
Another "Meritorious" Timber Lawsuit Fails: Do Substantive Riders Warrant an Exception to
the Plain Language Rule?, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 2 n.4 (1997) (quoting Michael
Axline, Salvage Logging: Point and Counterpoint: Forest Health and the Politics of
Expediency, 26 ENVTL. L. 613, 613 n.2 (1996)).
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2005" in Public Law Number 109-13, section 6036.1' As evidenced in
the legislative history, the bill passed very quickly with support from the
International Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies, whose
members include all fifty state government fish and wildlife agencies."7
The bill asserts that states have the authority to regulate fish and wildlife
in any manner the state deems appropriate and the Dormant Commerce
106. Reaffirmation of State Regulation of Resident & Nonresident Hunting & Fishing
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-1.3, § 6036 (2005).
SEC. 6036. STATE REGULATION OF RESIDENT AND
NONRESIDENT HUNTING AND FISHING. (a) SHORT TITLE.-
This section may be cited as the 'Reaffirmation of State Regulation of
Resident and Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Act of 2005'.
(b) DECLARATION OF POLICY AND CONSTRUCTION OF
CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE.-
(1) IN GENERAL-It is the policy of Congress that it is in the
public interest for each State to continue to regulate the taking for
any purpose of fish and wildlife within its boundaries, including by
means of laws or regulations that differentiate between residents
and nonresidents of such State with respect to the availability of
licenses or permits for taking of particular species of fish or wildlife,
the kind and numbers of fish and wildlife that may be taken, or the
fees charged in connection with issuance of licenses or permits for
hunting or fishing.
(2) CONSTRUCTION OF CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE.-
Silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose
any barrier under clause 3 of Section 8 of Article I of the
Constitution (commonly referred to as the 'commerce clause') to
the regulation of hunting or fishing by a State or Indian tribe.
(c) LIMITATIONS.-Nothing in this section shall be construed-
(1) to limit the applicability or effect of any Federal law related to
the protection or management of fish or wildlife or to the
regulation of commerce;
(2) to limit the authority of the United States to prohibit hunting or
fishing on any portion of the lands owned by the United States; or
(3) to abrogate, abridge, affect, modify, supersede or alter any
treaty-reserved right or other right of any Indian tribe as
recognized by any other means, including, but not limited to,
agreements with the United States, Executive Orders, statutes, and
judicial decrees, and by Federal law.
(d) STATE DEFINED.-For purposes of this section, the term 'State'
includes the several States, the District of Columbia. the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American
Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
107. 14 CONG. REC. E202, E203 (2005); 151 CONG. REC. H2997-02, 3023 (2005); John J.
Jackson III, Nonresidents Stripped of Constitutional Rights in Congress, CONSERVATION
FORCE, INC., June 2005, at 2-3 (on file with author).
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Clause does not prohibit such regulation.' °8 The purpose of the bill is to
reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision in Conservation Force, Inc. and to
stop courts from finding discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations
unconstitutional based on the Dormant Commerce Clause.
109
C. Post Public Law Number 109-13, Section 6036
As a result of section 6036, cases pending in Illinois and Nevada
were dismissed because the cases depended exclusively on the Dormant
Commerce Clause."' Both the Tenth and the Eighth Circuits held that
claims based on the Dormant Commerce Clause were moot.
1. Tenth Circuit
Two months after section 6036 was enacted, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the District Court of Wyoming's decision to grant summary
judgment for Wyoming by upholding the state's discriminatory
nonresident hunting regulations.111 The challenge in this case was based
on the Equal Protection Clause and the Dormant Commerce Clause.12
The Tenth Circuit determined that there was not an equal protection
violation. "3  In analyzing the equal protection claim, the court
concluded that hunters are not a suspect class, and hunting is not a
fundamental right."' Therefore, the regulation receives rational basis
review, and the state has a legitimate interest; the regulation is rationally
related to that legitimate state interest. 5  Furthermore, the Tenth
Circuit held that, in light of section 6036, the Dormant Commerce
Clause challenge is moot, a point that the plaintiff conceded. "6 The
108. § 6036.
109. 14 CONG. REC. E202, E203 (2005); 151 CONG. REC. H2997-02, 3023 (2005); see also
discussion supra Part II.B.3.
110. I11. Recreational Res. Org. v. I11. Dept. of Natural Res., No. 04-3236 (C.D. 111. 2005)
(granting Plaintiffs voluntary dismissal motion); Taulman v. Moran, No. 04-00996 (D. Nev.
2005) (dismissed); see also Jackson, supra note 107, at 2-3; Nonresident Tags, the Courts,
Congress, Oh Gosh!, 91 EASTMAN'S HUNTING J. (MEMBERS RES. SuPP.) 83, 83 (Oct.-Nov.
2005), available at http://www.eastmans.com/MRS91.pdf.
111. Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2005).
112. Id.; see generally Peter C. Nicolaysen, Comment, Reserving Wildlife for Resident
Consumption: Is the Dormant Commerce Clause the Outfitters' White Knight?, 32 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 125 (1997) (discussing the possibility of a future Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to Wyoming's regulations).
113. Schutz, 415 F.3d at 1131.
114. Id. at 1135.
115. Id. at 1135-36.
116. Id. at 1131.
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court based its decision on the fact that "a successful dormant
Commerce Clause claim is congressional inaction, so when Congress
does act, the dormancy ends, thus leaving the courts obliged to follow
congressional will."17
2. Eighth Circuit
Within one month of section 6036 becoming law, the District Court
of North Dakota published its decision regarding Minnesota's challenge
to the constitutionality of North Dakota's waterfowl regulation based on
the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause." 8 The court granted North Dakota's motion for summary
judgment, upholding the state's discriminatory nonresident hunting
regulations, but not based on section 6036. The court found that North
Dakota's waterfowl law did not violate the Privileges and Immunities
Clause because a state may charge more for nonresidents to hunt just
like a state may charge more for nonresidents to attend the state's
universities. 9  The court found that virtually all states require
nonresidents to pay more for hunting or fishing licenses.120 In regard to
the Dormant Commerce Clause, the district court concluded,
"Congressional interpretation of what is and is not interstate commerce
is not controlling on the judicial branch." ' i In other words, the district
court dismissed the section 6036 argument. However, the court found
no violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause and went on to say, the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Conservation Force, Inc. "is flawed in its
reasoning and [is] unprecedented."' 2  Before concluding, the court
noted that the new North Dakota hunting regulations may have
retaliatory effects for North Dakota fishers in Minnesota, and North
Dakota may want to rethink the legislation.
On appeal, Minnesota challenged the North Dakota regulations
based on a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the
117. Id. at 1138.
118. Minnesota v. Hoeven, 370 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D.N.D. 2005), affd in part, affd in part
on other grounds, 456 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006); see discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
119. See Hoeven, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 964-65.
120. Id. at 965-66.
121. Id. at 973. Contra discussion supra Part II.B.3 (noting an exception for laws that
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause is if Congress authorizes the state to regulate the area
of commerce).
122. Hoeven, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
123. See id. at 973.
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Dormant Commerce Clause."' Minnesota argued that the regulations
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause because the regulations
permitted residents to hunt on land owned by the residents without
getting a hunting license but required nonresidents to purchase a license
to hunt on land owned by the nonresident. 125 Minnesota claimed this
interfered with a "stick in the bundle of property rights accompanying
land ownership.' ' 126 The Eighth Circuit held that although the Privileges
and Immunities Clause protects property rights, hunting is not
considered a part of the bundle of rights. 127  Additionally, Minnesota
argued that the regulations violated the Dormant Commerce Clause,
section 6036 did not apply to migratory waterfowl, and section 6036 was
invalid because it was passed in an appropriations bill.128 The Eighth
Circuit declined to address the merits of the Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge and instead concluded the challenge was moot because of
section 6036.129 The court reasoned that section 6036's status as a rider
on an appropriations bill did not affect the bill's validity and that in
looking at legislative history, it was Congress's intent to preclude this
type of challenge. 3 ° Despite this seemingly conclusive opinion, the
Eighth Circuit seemed to leave open the possibility for future litigation
based on the Dormant Commerce Clause by stating "we need not
decide today whether Section 6036 will forever preclude challenges to
restrictions on nonresident hunting under the dormant Commerce
Clause," and "[t]he application of the 'safe harbor' [section 6036] for the
future ... has not been reached. In light of the uncertainties, the state
officials in Minnesota and North Dakota may well consider discussing
the issue and seeking a satisfactory resolution, rather than litigating
further." '.
124. Minnesota v. Hoeven, 456 F.3d 826, 828-29 (8th Cir. 2006). It is interesting to note
that Minnesota also has discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations. MINN. STAT. §
97A.475(1)-(3) (2006). Minnesota not only discriminates, but Minnesota prohibits
nonresidents from hunting moose, elk, and prairie chickens. See id.
125. See Hoeven, 456 F.3d at 833-34.
126. Id. at 835.
127. See id. at 836; see also Taulman v. Hayden, No. 05-1118, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
65493, at *19 (D. Kan. Sept. 13, 2006) (granting summary judgment because Kansas
regulations do not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause). The plaintiff in Taulman v.
Hayden is the owner of USO. 2006 Brochure, supra note 76.
128. Hoeven, 456 F.3d at 832-33.
129. Id. at 832.
130. Id. at 833.
131. Id. at 833, 836 n.9 (emphasis removed).
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V. THE PROPOSAL FOR DISCRIMINATORY NONRESIDENT HUNTING
REGULATIONS
This Comment theorizes that interest groups and hunters will
continue to litigate the constitutionality of discriminatory nonresident
hunting regulations, especially in light of the Eighth Circuit's decision,
which seemed to encourage or predict future lawsuits. This Comment
argues that there are benefits to discriminatory nonresident hunting
regulations and that continued challenges harm both resident and
nonresident hunters. This Comment proposes that challenges to
nonresident hunting regulations need to be minimized and that this can
partially be accomplished through state modification of certain
regulations and awareness among hunters that pitting hunter against
hunter only hurts hunting opportunities for both nonresident and
resident hunters.
A. The Future Lawsuits
Nonresident hunters have challenged discriminatory nonresident
hunting regulations since the nineteenth century, '32 and it is likely that
challenges to the constitutionality of nonresident hunting regulations
will continue for the following reasons.
Since the mid-nineteenth century, recreational hunting has become a
very large business; hunting has become a multi-billion dollar industry. '33
Annually, hunters spend an estimated $24.7 billion at the retail level and
$746 million for licenses and fees.1'3 If one views hunting as an industry,
then the decision in Baldwin, where the Supreme Court held that elk
hunting is a sport and not a livelihood, '35 would seem ill-advised. If one
wants to protect hunting as a family tradition and a recreational sport,
then the idea that states are limiting nonresident hunting, which is
primarily a business operation, would seem to be the best solution.
Additionally, as the population grows and habitat for wildlife decreases,
there will be more hunters but less wildlife to hunt. 116  Therefore,
because of the amount of money involved in hunting and the likelihood
132. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
133. Jim Amrhein, In Defense of Hunters: Hunting for Reason and Respect, WHISKEY
AND GUNPOWDER, Nov. 9, 2005, http://www.whiskeyandgunpowder.com/Archives/2005
/20051110.html.
134. See Amrhein, supra note 133.
135. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371,388 (1978).
136. See generally Jackson, supra note 107.
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that the population will increase while wildlife populations will decrease,
it is unlikely that litigation will cease.
Furthermore, wildlife is viewed as a national resource, and the
residents of the United States, whether they are nonresidents or
residents of a particular state, should be allowed to enjoy the natural
resources of a particular state. 137 Some argue this means that
nonresidents should have access to federal lands to hunt.' 38 Opponents
of discriminatory nonresident regulations have confused the issues.
Access to federal lands is not the same as free access to hunting. A
nonresident has access to federal lands, and discriminatory nonresident
hunting regulations do not limit that access; they only limit hunting.
Finally, according to its website and monthly newsletter,
Conservation Force, Inc., the plaintiff in the Arizona and Nevada
lawsuits, will continue to challenge discriminatory nonresident hunting
regulations.'39 In Conservation Force's June 2005 newsletter, the group
asserts this issue is not resolved, and there are plans for more
litigation.' 4°  The group has started a litigation fund, entitled the
Nonresident Rights Defense Fund.14 1 Conservation Force, Inc. identifies
two legal strategies of the group.
42
The first strategy is to challenge section 6036.14 A claim based on a
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause would seem to be
unsuccessful in light of section 6036, unless Congress repealed the law.'"
If Congress repealed section 6036, then there might be a successful claim
under the Dormant Commerce Clause. In light of the Eighth Circuit's
opinion, there likely could be a challenge based on the constitutionality
of section 6036 because section 6036 has never been codified. An
uncodified law is still a valid law, and this type of challenge would have
137. See John J. Jackson III, Attack on Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Renewed and
Stepped Up, CONSERVATION FORCE, INC., Mar. 2005, at 2 (on file with author).
138. See Dusty Routh, Equal Hunting for Nonresidents?, ESPN OUTDOORS, Feb. 8,
2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1984324&type=story; see also H.R. 5287, 109th
Cong. (2006). The purpose of House Bill 5287 is "[t]o recognize the heritage of hunting and
to provide opportunities for continued hunting on Federal public land" Id. The bill also
provides that nothing in this bill "affects the authority, jurisdiction, or responsibility of a State
to manage, control, or regulate fish and wildlife under State Law (including regulations) on
land or water in the State, including Federal public land." Id. at § 4(f)(1).
139. See generally Jackson, supra note 107.




144. See generally Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2005).
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to establish that there was a due process violation due to a lack of
notice. '45 It is highly unlikely that this challenge would be successful
because a successful challenge would include a nonresident hunter
receiving a fine for violating section 6036, and section 6036 does not
create penalties. 146
The second strategy is to frame a lawsuit that has a plaintiff who is
an outfitter, who wants to or does operate in two or more states.147 Most
likely, this lawsuit would challenge state laws based on the Privileges
and Immunities Clause that limit a nonresident outfitter's ability to
operate in a particular state. The goal of the lawsuit would be to
challenge the decision in Baldwin that held that hunting was not a
"means to the nonresident's livelihood."'48
B. The Benefits of Discriminatory Nonresident Hunting Regulation
1. Taxes & Support
Discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations provide nonresident
hunters the opportunity to contribute to the state funds used to protect
and manage wildlife. Resident hunters pay local and state taxes to
support the wildlife and the wildlife management in their areas.' 49 The
higher fees for nonresidents are to compensate for the taxes that
residents pay. 5' Therefore, fee and license regulations provide the state
with funds to manage the wildlife, which in turn benefits both resident
and nonresident hunters."'
2. Tragedy of the Commons
Discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations are necessary to
prevent state wildlife populations from being subject to a classic
145. See generally United States v. Burgess, Nos. 133066, 133067, 133068, 133618,
140420, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11227 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1987) (holding that a law that was
never published in the Statutes at Large or in the United States Code that gave rise to
criminal penalties was unconstitutional under Article 1, Sections 9 and 10 and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment because the law failed to provide
notice of the criminal behavior); Armstrong v. Maple Leaf Apartments, 436 F. Supp. 1125
(N.D. Okla. 1977).
146. See generally Reaffirmation of State Regulation of Resident & Nonresident
Hunting & Fishing Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 6036 (2005)
147. See Jackson, supra note 107, at 4.
148. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).
149. See Routh, supra note 138.
150. See id.
151. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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example of the tragedy of the commons. '52 By charging higher fees,
states internalize the national benefits of wildlife preservation. "3 If
states charged higher fees or allotted fewer licenses for residents, then
local residents would have less of an incentive to conserve and preserve
the local resources because nonresident hunters would push out resident
hunters. "' Thus, to preserve wildlife, states must internalize the




Many state constitutions have guaranteed the right of their citizens
to enjoy the states' resources, which in some states implicitly or
explicitly means hunting.5 6 If states gave equal access to nonresidents
and residents for hunting licenses, and the probability of residents
drawing a tag diminished to a very small percentage or the fee became
too high for resident hunters, then some states would be denying their
residents their state constitutionally protected hunting rights.
4. Equality
In most states, any resident, provided the resident meets age and
hunter's education requirements, can hunt within the state every year,
with some limitations based on the type of permit.'57 Nonresident
hunters can also hunt in their own state, making them resident hunters.
Additionally, if nonresident hunters are willing to pay for travel and
outfitting costs,'58 then the nonresident hunter can conceivably hunt in
more than one state. Thus, a resident hunter who cannot afford to hunt
as a nonresident hunter in another state limits her or his hunt to one
state, while a nonresident hunter who can afford to hunt in multiple
states has the potential to hunt in numerous states. If nonresident
hunters were granted a larger portion of the permits, then this would
mean that resident hunters, who are unable to pay the costs of traveling
152. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 592-611.
153. See id. at 592.
154. See id. at 604-07; Rosie Cataldo, Hunting for a Solution, FEDGAZETFrE, July 2002,
at 13-15, available at http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/pubs/fedgaz/02-07/hunting.cfm.
155. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 592-611.
156. See generally Adams et al., supra note 37.
157. See, e.g., Nevada Wildlife Commission: Licenses and Laws, http://www.ndow.org/
law/regs/com-reg/index.shtm (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
158. A five-day elk hunt can cost about $8000 dollars, which does not include travel. See
2006 Brochure, supra note 76, at 17.
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and outfitting services to hunt as nonresidents, have a substantially
decreased opportunity to hunt. Currently, the Census Bureau ranks six
western states in the bottom ten states for the lowest average annual
income. Those six western states are popular places to hunt, have
discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations, and have regulations
that are likely to be challenged by nonresident hunters; therefore, many
of the resident hunters in the western states would not get the
opportunity to hunt because they would not get permits in their resident
state and could not afford to hunt elsewhere.'59 Finally, if nonresident
hunters won the litigation, the result would be fewer hunting
opportunities for the common resident, especially in the poorer states,
and more opportunities for those who can afford nonresident hunting.
Nonresident hunting regulations help protect hunting as a recreation
that can be enjoyed by the common person rather than simply those
who can afford the expenses of nonresident hunting.
C. Continued Litigation Hurts Nonresident and Resident Hunters
Continuing the litigation over discriminatory nonresident hunting
regulations hurts hunters for three reasons: (1) it pits hunters against
hunters; (2) it limits a state's ability to protect wildlife; and (3) it
provides incentives for states to retaliate.
1. Hunter v. Hunter
The first reason that litigation hurts nonresident and resident
hunters is that it pits hunters against hunters.' 6° By continuing litigation,
nonresident hunters are forcing states to defend their practices by
diverting funds from wildlife management to litigation costs.16' This
means less money for state biologists to research game populations,
game wardens to patrol and respond to suspected poaching activities,
and conservation efforts. Furthermore, by diverting attention and funds
to the nonresident debate, nonresident hunters are providing the
159. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE RANKINGS: AVERAGE ANNUAL PAY, 2004,
http://www.census.gov/statab/ranks/rank27.html. New Mexico ranked 41 ($31,411), Wyoming
ranked 42 ($31,210), Idaho ranked 46 ($29,871), North Dakota ranked 47 ($28,987), South
Dakota ranked 49 ($28,281), and Montana ranked 50 ($27,830). Id. For comparison, the top
ten states for average annual pay are the following: Connecticut ranked 1 ($51,007), New
York ranked 2 ($49,941), Massachusetts ranked 3 ($48,916), New Jersey ranked 4 ($48,065),
California ranked 5 ($44,641), Maryland ranked 6 ($42,579), Delaware ranked 7 ($42,487),
Illinois ranked 8 ($42,277), Virginia ranked 9 ($40,534), and Minnesota ranked 10 ($40,398).
160. See generally Nevada Wildlife Commission: Policy Update, supra note 99.
161. See generally id.
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opportunity for anti-hunting groups to attack hunting.1 62 It is important
for hunters to work together as a coalition, not as factions, to support
and encourage the sport and tradition of hunting.
2. State's Ability to Protect Wildlife
By continuing litigation, nonresident hunting groups are consistently
calling into question a state's ability to maintain and regulate its natural
resources. 63  If the courts declare nonresident hunting regulations
unconstitutional, then a state's power to regulate wildlife will erode."6
By eroding a state's power, these groups are paving the way for federal
control over wildlife management. It is important to keep wildlife
management at a local and not a federal level. The government entity
that manages wildlife needs to be capable on a seasonal basis to change
hunting and fishing regulations for the next year165 The state and local
systems are best equipped for changing regulations on a regular basis.
Furthermore, regulations within a state will vary from location to
location. 166 Again, local wildlife management has the best information
to address the needs of local wildlife populations. If wildlife
management was federalized, regulations could not as easily be adapted
to meet local needs. The Attorney General for North Dakota, Wayne
Stenehjem, summed up the sentiment associated with federalizing
hunting regulations: "[i]f you like what the Corps of Engineers has done
with the Missouri River, you will be thrilled with what the federal
government does with game and fish in North Dakota. ' 67
3. States' Retaliation
If the litigation continues, states could retaliate against nonresident
hunters and outfitters in two ways.
First, a state could retaliate by repealing the guide regulations.'6 It
is common in western states to have guide regulations.69 In general,
there are two types of guide regulations. The first type of regulation
162. See generally Amrhein, supra note 133.
163. See generally Nevada Wildlife Commission: Policy Update, supra note 99.
164. See id.
165. See generally Nevada Wildlife Commission: Licenses and Laws, supra note 157.
166. See, e.g., Nevada Wildlife Commission: County Regulations, http://www.ndow.org
/law/regs/index.shtm (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
167. Hinton, supra note 99.
168. See discussion supra Part II.A.
169. See generally Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2005).
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requires nonresidents to hire an outfitter. 7° The second type of
regulation limits the number of outfitters and makes it illegal to hire a
non-state-licensed outfitter.'71 Thus, states help to guarantee outfitters'
business with the current regulations. One of the plaintiffs, an outfitter,
involved in the lawsuits in Nevada, Arizona, and Kansas has challenged
the regulations in the hope that outfitters and specifically USO could
gain more business. 172 If states began taking a retaliatory approach and
eliminated the guide regulations, then the retaliation could financially
harm outfitters.
Second, a state could retaliate by not cooperating with the
nonresident groups challenging the hunting regulations. In the past,
states wanting to avoid the cost of litigation changed their
discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations.173 It is possible that
states will either rethink their past cooperation or limit their
cooperation in the future.
D. How to Minimize the Litigation over Nonresident Hunting
Regulations
Because of the benefits of discriminatory nonresident hunting
regulations and the harm that future lawsuits will bring to nonresident
and resident hunters, it is important to minimize challenges to
nonresident hunting regulations. This Comment proposes that states
evaluate their regulations to limit exposure to suits and that hunters play
an active role in minimizing litigation.
1. States' Role
There are a number of ways that a state can change its regulations to
limit challenges to the regulations while balancing the needs and
interests of the state's resident hunters. This Comment suggests that
there are different ways to adjust a state's regulations, but the proposals
that this Comment makes should not be read as a proposition that a
state should enact all proposals, but rather a state should consider one
or two of these proposals to limit challenges. While these proposals are
not ideal, and resident hunters may resist many of them, the purpose of
170. See id.
171. See, e.g., Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks: Guides and Outfitters, http://fwp.mt.
gov/fishing/fishingmontana/guides.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
172. See generally Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2002).
173. See Nevada Wildlife Commission: Policy Update, supra note 99; Rob Thornberry,
Radical Changes Proposed for Moose Hunting, IDAHO FALLS POST REG., Sep. 9, 1999, at D8.
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these proposals is to limit challenges in court so that a state does not
have to use funds that could be used for wildlife management to defend
its practice in court.
First, if a state does not want to have its discriminatory regulations
challenged, then that state should not challenge other states'
discriminatory nonresident regulations. In Minnesota v. Hoeven,
Minnesota challenged North Dakota's discriminatory nonresident
hunting regulations17'  even though Minnesota had its own
discriminatory nonresident hunting regulations that prohibited
nonresident hunters from hunting moose, elk, and prairie chickens. 5
By not challenging other state's regulations, a state is less likely to
provoke legal attacks on that state's own hunting regulations.
Second, a state could create a reciprocity agreement with another
state in which the two states agree to reserve a certain number of
licenses or to charge a lower fee for the other state's residents. This
type of agreement would be similar to the agreements that state
universities make with one another. While this type of agreement could
be challenging to administer, it could have the possibility of creating
constructive relationships with resident and nonresident hunters.
Third, states should consider getting rid of weapons regulations that
prohibit nonresidents from using certain types of weapons. There seems
to be very little justification for this type of regulation, except the
unfounded assumption that nonresident hunters are careless with
certain types of weapons. Furthermore, a weapons regulation does not
provide any direct benefit to resident hunters, except that the regulation
might deter some nonresident hunters from attempting to hunt because
hunting with a muzzleloader might seem more challenging than hunting
with a rifle.
Fourth, states should consider getting rid of regulations that
completely ban all nonresidents from hunting certain species. A
complete ban only makes the nonresident want to challenge the
regulation. By permitting a few nonresidents to hunt, the nonresidents'
energy is refocused from "I will never be able to hunt" to "I hope I get a
license this year."
Fifth, states should consider getting rid of regulations that require
nonresident landowners to purchase a license to hunt on their own land
when resident landowners are not required to purchase a license to hunt
on their own land. Either a state could require both resident and
174. Minnesota v. Hoeven, 456 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006).
175. See MINN. STAT. § 97A.475(1)-(3) (2006).
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nonresident hunters to purchase a license, or it could require neither
one to purchase a license. If nonresident landowners are paying taxes,
then the state is already benefiting from the property taxes, and there is
less justification for requiring the license.
2. Hunters' Role
Finally, one of the most powerful ways to minimize challenges to
nonresident regulations is for hunters to realize that fighting among
themselves will not advance nonresident and resident hunters' interest.
State wildlife and fish agencies along with local chapters of conservation
groups are in the best position for disseminating information to hunters.
When hunters realize that challenges to discriminatory nonresident
hunting regulations only hurt hunting by diverting resources away from
wildlife management, then hunters will put pressure on hunting groups
such as Conservation Force, Inc. and USO to stop challenging the
regulations and start uniting as one front.176
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the Ninth Circuit's decision in Conservation Force, Inc.
limited a state's ability to regulate hunting, Congress took action to
affirm a state's right to regulate hunting by enacting section 6036.
Congress's action has not fully remedied the issue. Consequently, as
nonresidents continue to challenge the hunting regulations, nonresident
and resident hunters' interest in preserving hunting will be damaged.
Resident and nonresident hunters will not be benefited by pitting
resident hunters against nonresident hunters and limiting valuable funds
that once were used to protect wildlife and are now used to defend
hunting regulations. Thus, states should review their current regulations
to limit liability while keeping in mind the needs and interests of their
resident hunters, and hunters must take action by putting pressure on
interest groups, outfitters, and hunters who continue to challenge the
discriminatory nonresident regulations.
JODI A. JANECEK
176. For an example of hunters uniting together and putting pressure on hunting groups
that challenge state regulations see Posting of USO Threatens Montana on PSE Archery,
http://forums.pse-archery.com/showthread.php?threadid=20406 (July 28, 2004 5:47 GMT-July
30, 2004 8:09 GMT).
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